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Judges and politics: an essay f rom 
Canada 
 
Allan C Hutchinson* 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto 
 
'We are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies 
clash by night.' 
Matthew Arnold 1 
 
It is said of statistics that what they reveal is interesting, but what they 
hide is crucial. Much the same can be said of the present British debate 
over constitutional change and the courts. The various constitutional 
reforms proposed seem to be obvious and long overdue abolishing the 
post of Lord Chancellor; setting up a Supreme Court separate from the 
House of Lords; and establishing ajudicial appointments committee. 
However, at least as presented and dealt with by the government and the 
judges, while these innovations are interesting and generally positive, 
what they fail to mention or address is much more crucial and revealing. 
The government papers and the judiciary' s response resolutely refuse to 
tackle the central issue of what it is that judges do and whether it is 
done in a suitably legitimate and proper way. For all the sound and fury 
of constitutional engagement, the main antagonists share a deep and 
disturbing assumption that judicial power has and will continue to be 
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exercised in a non-political, objective and neutral manner. In this paper, 
by reference to the Canadian experience, I will challenge that assumption: 
it is not that judges are unprofessional or corrupt, but that adjudication is 
inescapably political and non-objective. Instead, I will offer a very 
different account of the adjudicative performance and propose a more 




What should a Supreme Court do to ensure that the government is meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities? Are there limits beyond which judges 
should not go in supervising government activities? If so, how are those 
limits to be determined? These important issues were confronted by the 
Canadian courts in the Fall of 2003 in Doucet.2 While the Canadian courts 
had over 20 years of experience under their collective belt in tackling 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they had not staked out any 
comprehensive position on the precise role of courts in remedying 
Charter wrongs. Doucet obliged them to reveal their hand a little more 
fully. A trial judge had decided that it was incumbent on the Nova 
Scotia government to provide French-language secondary schooling 
in certain areas. While the government did not deny the parents' rights 
under s 23 of the Charter to have such schooling for their children, it 
had decided not to prioritise those rights and had delayed fulfilling its 
 
obligations. However, not only did the trial judge order the Province 
to use its 'best efforts' to provide school facilities and programmes 
by specified dates, he also retained jurisdiction to hear reports on the 
status of those efforts. The Province contended that this continuing 
judicial supervision inappropriately trespassed onto the government's 
political discretion. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed and 
held that, while courts have broad-ranging powers under s 24(1) of 
the Charter to fashion remedies, the Charter does not extend a court's 
jurisdiction to meddle in the details of a Province's administrative 
management: there were limits to the courts' authority to interfere with 
what were matters of political judgment. A majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada had no such qualms. 
By the narrowest of 5-4 margins, the Supreme Court decided that the 
Constitution and legal tradition demanded that the trial judge should remain 
seized of the issue. Speaking for their colleagues, Iacobucci and Arbour 11 
recognised that the courts should be cautious in involving themselves in such 
matters. However, the courts must complement their purposive interpretation 
of Charter rights with a purposive approach to remedies in order to ensure that 
Charter rights are given full and meaningful protection. While the court must 
also be sensitive to the limits of its role as judicial arbiter and not interfere 
unduly with the roles of the other branches of governance, the judicial 
crafting of remedies will vary according to the right at issue and the context 
of each case: the advancement of democratic ends should not be 
 
accomplished by undemocratic means. Although the remedy was admittedly 
creative and novel, it did balance the parents' rights against the Province's 
privilege to decide upon the details of educational planning. Accordingly, 
the majority held that, in the particular circumstances of the Nova Scotia 
schools and mindful that delay might defeat the parents' rights, a supervisory 
remedy 'took into account, and did not depart unduly or unnecessarily from, 
the role of the courts in our constitutional democracy'. 3 
The dissenters took a much more restrained line and were strongly critical 
of the majority's position. Drawing heavily on the common law doctrine of 
functus officio, the minority were not at all convinced that the trial judge's 
order was clear and maintained that, once a court had issued its decision, it 
ought to rely upon the government to act with reasonable diligence and in 
good faith: it was not the role of courts to act as direct overseers or 
superintendents of the executive function. Moreover, on behalf the minority, 
LeBel and Deschamps 11 insisted that it was vitally important that the 
courts respect the appropriate constitutional boundaries and balance 
between the different branches of government power: democracy demanded 
that the judicial role be limited and modest. Although it was imperative that 
citizens' Charter rights be properly and fully enforced, the minority took 
the definite view that this did not permit the courts to interfere in the 
legitimate exercise of executive discretion. Indeed, chastising the majority 
for its rather cavalier approach to such delicate constitutional 
considerations, the minority considered that invasive remedies, such as the 
trial judge's in this case, were illegitimate and amounted to a virtual micro-
 
management of administrative management which 'led to the improper 
politicisation of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive' .4 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's decision was greeted with a deluge 
of public and academic commentary. 'Activism' was the word on most 
people's lips. It sounds as if it is something positive healthy, vital and 
purposeful. But, when it is used in connection with courts, many hear it 
only as having disturbing negative resonances uppity, illegitimate and 
uncontrolled. At the heart of these responses was the concern that the courts 
might have gone beyond the bounds of what it is that unelected judges 
should be doing in a constitutional democracy; they might have vacated the 
realm of legal decisionmaking and trespassed into the arena of political 
discretion. The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 
pushed the courts more into the spotlight and asked them to resolve more 
controversial disputes. With a higher public profile, the courts' work has come 
under closer and more critical scrutiny. Indeed, as the public and academic 
commentators tend to be the same people, the only difference between the 
public and academic debate is one of greater length and occasional subtlety 
of contribution. After over 20 years of debate about the legitimacy and 
reach of Charter review by courts over government action, the main thrusts 
of the response were predictable and well-rehearsed. On one side were those 
who viewed the majority decision as further evidence that the judges had 
overstepped the bounds of their authority and competence: it was blatant 
and unwelcome 'judicial activism'. By interfering in the fiscal 
administration of public programmes, an unelected, unrepresentative, and 
 
unchecked judiciary had violated the separation of powers and imperilled 
'established traditions of responsible government'. Some went so far as to 
see the decision as a 'gratuitous and arrogant' power-grab which bordered 
on the 'monarchical'. However, on the other side, there was applause for a 
bold court which had overcome the pusillanimity of some its members 
to provide meaningful and effective protection to people's constitutional 
rights. If the Rule of Law was to be truly respected, it was thought 
essential that constitutional entitlements be effective remedies; it was not 
only desirable, but necessary that governments not be allowed to evade, 
complicate, or ignore court orders. Far from imperilling responsible 
government, the Doucet decision had contribu ted to the legitimacy of 
Canada's democratic commitments by giving the Charter 'muscles' and 
'teeth'.5 While both sides have something important to contribute, I am not 
convinced that either has taken a defensible or convincing stance: the Charter 
debate is much broader and deeper than both sides contemplate or accept. 
Consequently, it is important to examine the courts' and the commentators' 
arguments at greater length and to explore an alternative viewpoint which 
contends that, whether activist or restrained, the judges are involved in an 
inevitably and thoroughly political endeavour: all efforts to separate law 
from politics are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, while my critique is 
decidedly radical, it is not deliberately negative. An acceptance that 






The more traditional position is that taken by the minority and championed 
by a cadre of conservative academic critics. Accelerated by Charter 
adjudication, but not restricted to it, the Canadian judicial system is 
considered to have lost its way and to be hastily on its way to political hell 
in an activist handcart. The courts, especially the Supreme Court of Canada, 
are condemned as having become highly politicised and highly 
interventionist in their decisions and judgments. Effectively abandoning 
established legal principles and modes of legal reasoning, the judiciary has 
unwisely and indulgently shifted its focus to an analysis based on 'values'. 
Moreover, unlike the traditional understanding of judicial decision-making, 
this resort to values has more to do with a judge's own subjective political 
commitments than an objective assessment of a case's legal merits. Critics 
charge that, when recent judicial pronouncements are looked at as a body of 
work, they have not only become blatantly political, but reflect and 
instantiate a particular and partisan set of liberal-feminist commitments. In 
effect, these critics charge that 'judicial activism' is not a careless aberration by 
an overworked judiciary, but a concerted dereliction of official duty by a 
politically motivated judiciary. As such, there is an indignant call to return to 
the passive and neutral virtues of judicial restraint so that the promise of 
Canadian democracy can be redeemed. Of course, judicial activism has no part 
to play in such a restorative vision of law.6 
While this nostalgic call for 'judicial restraint' is expressed in the most 
 
passionate and least restrained terms, it has garnered considerable support. 
However, while this traditional critique is long on the details of the judiciary's 
current political fall from constitutional grace, its adherents are very light on 
how a purely legal mode of principled adjudication can be performed. While 
these exhortations to 'stick to the law' are seductive, they offer little 
suggestion of how such a seemingly prosaic practice can be achieved. At a 
theoretical level, three initial observations come to mind. First, the 
ascertainment of legal principles is itself fraught with political 
contamination and content. 'Established' is simply a way of saying that 
certain controversial moral or political commitments are now accepted by 
the legal community as settled; this is less an endorsement of the principles' 
apolitical nature and more an acknowledgement that general acceptance is a 
form of political validation. Secondly, the range of established principles is 
extremely broad and often encompasses competing maxims; there is no neutral 
or non-political way to select between contradictory principles. Thirdly, even if 
it is possible to isolate a relevant and exclusive legal principle, it is far from 
obvious how that general principle can be applied to particular facts in an entirely 
objective or impartial manner. 7 In short, despite the critic's yearning for a 
simpler and more professional age, there is no purely technical and non-political 
way to engage in a principled mode of adjudication. This is especially true of 
the Charter. Not only is what amounts to 'freedom' or 'equality' the stuff of fierce 
ideological debate (and how one relates to the other), but how such values are to be 
enforced within s l 's 'such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society' merely invites judges to wade even deeper into 
 
the political waters. Adjudication necessarily involves political choice. 
The fact is that the dissatisfaction with 'judicial activism' is itself a 
political campaign. Behind the traditional rhetoric of principled 
adjudication, there is a very definite and partial political agenda. While 
it is understandable why such critics would prefer to occupy the neutral 
territory of formal constitutional technique rather than contested turf of 
substantive political alignment, the effort to portray and promote a non-
political mode of constitutional adjudication as being possible and 
desirable is a neat but deceptive manoeuvre. When a closer look is taken 
at those occasions on which the critics raise the spectre of activism and 
those on which they do not, it will be seen that the difference is a blunt 
ideological one. Those decisions that do not fit their political agenda 
are condemned as activist and those that do fit are defended as 
appropriate. The constitutional line is one of their own political making. 
In general, those decisions which promote greater equality (for 
example, gay rights, aboriginal land claims, etc) are dismissed as activist 
and illegitimate, whereas those which defend greater liberty (for 
example, election spending, male property rights, etc) are show-cased as 
valid exercises of judicial authority. Yet, in terms of their fit with the 
opaque constitutional text and the courts' activist tendencies, there is 
nothing to choose between them. It is only that some substantive values 
are preferred over others. Accordingly, the claim of 'activism' is simply a 
 
veiled criticism that the courts are being too progressive and making 
decisions that do not reflect desirable conservative values: any court that 
stands by and lets constitutional values be ignored or belittled is at fault. 
But there is no technical or purely legal way to decide what those values 
are law is politics by other means. The Charter is a contested site for 
political debate, not a definitive or neutral contribution to that debate. 
Indeed, the Doucet 8 decision itself is a good example of the disingenuity 
of those who reject 'judicial activism' in the name of traditional judicial 
virtues. As the judgments of the minority reveal, theirs is less a rejection 
of political decision-making and more a championing of a particular and 
partial view of constitutional politics. Despite repeated incantations 
about 'the separation of powers' and that 'the legislature and the 
executi ve are ... the principal loci of democratic will', the minority 
makes no real effort to demonstrate that this is somehow an accepted 
legal principle as opposed to a contested political commitment. It is 
not at all that the majority reject these general principles, it is that they 
have a different view of what those commitments demand in the 
particular circumstances. Moreover, it is unconvincing for the 
minority to maintain that the judiciary 'should avoid turning 
themselves into managers of the public service'. The entire history of 
administrative law confounds such trite observations about the need 
to 'avoid interfering in the management of public administration'. 
 
Furthermore, while it is important to recognise that there are 
constitutional boundaries to judicial action, those boundaries are not 
independently given, but are developed and negotiated by the courts 
themselves. While judges must respect that the executive and 
legislative branches are 'the principal loci of democratic will' ,9 that is 
not the point. In light of the fact that the judges, including members 
of the Doucet minority, regularly and rightly interfere with executive 
and legislative authority when they breach the Charter, the real point is 
when and how they should so interfere as a matter of constitutional 
requirement, not whether they ever should. Accordingly, the 
difference between the majority and minority judgments is not 
between legitimate and illegitimate modes of adjudication, but 
between competing visions of an appropriate constitutional and 
democratic order. Each has to be defended in political terms: there is 
simply no method by which to declare that one is more intrinsically 
legal and, therefore, non-contestable than another. It hardly advances 
the democratic cause to deploy subterfuge and to pass off political 
commitments as constitutional mandates. Decisions should be 
celebrated or condemned for the substantive values that they uphold, 
not for their vague failure to respect some spurious formal 






The Charter crystallised the long-standing dilemma of the courts in trying to 
reconcile their new role as active guardians of fundamental values with the 
democratic values and traditions of Canadian society. They had to develop a 
way to act decisively as well as legitimately. In the Charter's early years, 
judges relied upon the old standby of 'liberal legalism' a sharp 
public/private distinction, neutral interpretation, and objective balancing as 
a method for legitimising their decisions and reconciling the courts' role 
with democracy. However, it soon became clear that this jurisprudential 
modus operandi was failing to placate either liberal or more radical critics 
who complained that judicial review was not fulfilling its functions as 
effectively or as democratically as it might. Not only were the courts' 
efforts at preserving a sharp distinction between legal analysis and political 
judgment becoming more transparent and u nconvincing, but the 
substantive pol itical values which animated their decisions were being 
revealed as increasingly outdated and unresponsive to contemporary 
Canadian sensibilities. Indeed, 'liberal legalism' was unable to command 
a sustained consensus even amongst judges. In response, the Supreme 
Court began to nurture a less legalistic and more pragmatic approach to 
its constitutional duties. Ironically, these very efforts to bolster their 
democratic legitimacy by relying upon an apparently more overt mode of 
democratic justification revealed even more starkly how undemocratic the 
 
judges' involvement judicial review under the Charter. w 
In recent years, there has been a turn to 'dialogue theory' as an 
alternative justification for judicial review. Judges and jurists have begun 
to accept that a strictly legalistic mode of constitutional adjudication is not 
available or viable and that some reliance upon contested political 
commitments is not only inevitable, but also desirable. The primary 
concern is less with politicisation itself and more with 'the degree to 
which judges are free to read their own preferences into law' .11 As such, 
activism is less about whether judges rely on political preferences at all 
and more about the sources of such values and the extent to which they 
rely on them. Cautioning that judges are not free to go wherever their 
personal political preferences take them, the dialogic approach does not 
abandon the idea or practice of maintaining a barrier between legitimate 
legal analysis and illegitimate political decision-making. Instead, in 
contrast to the anti-activists, it is argued that the distinction is much 
fuzzier, that the domain of law is much more expansive, and that the 
boundary between law and politics is much less breached. However, like 
the anti-activists, they do concede that there is a point at which the judges 
can be said to be no longer doing law; they will have wandered off into 
other parts of the constitutional and political domain. In some important 
sense, law is to exist separately from its judicial spokesperson such that 
law places some non-trivial constraints on what judges can do and say. 
 
While legal principles are more open and sensitive to political context, 
law is not only reduced to the contingent political preferences of the 
judiciary. 
Consequently, the general thrust of the dialogue theory is that, because 
the legislature possesses the final word on Charter matters by virtue of 
the s 33 override power, the courts can proceed to engage in a more overt 
balancing of political values under the s l 'reasonable limits' provision. 
The claim and hope is that the courts and the legislature will engage in an 
institutional conversation about the Charter and its requirements on 
particular and pressing issues of the day: the courts and the legislators 
have complementary roles that enable legislation to be carefully tailored 
to meet the government's political agenda and respect Charter values. The 
most prominent judicial advocate of a dialogic approach has been Justice 
Iacobucci who insists that 'judicial review on Charter grounds brings a 
certain measure of vitality to the democratic process, in that it fosters 
both dynamic interaction and accountability amongst the various 
branches'. In establishing a 'dialogic balance' and 'retaining a forum for 
dialogue' between the different branches of government, the courts must 
tread a thin, but vital line between deferential subservience and robust 
activism. 12 The courts and legislatures are to be dialogic partners in an 
institutional conversation to advance shared democratic goals. 
While this resort to 'democratic dialogue' does at least concede the 
 
normative nature of Charter decision-making and represent an effort to 
get beyond a discredited liberal legalism, it seems to have let the 
political cat out of the judicial bag without any plan for getting it back 
i n or keeping it suitably leashed. The majority judgments in Doucet 
again offer compelling evidence of this claim. Indeed, suspiciously bereft 
of any reference to 'dialogic theory', the judgment of Iacobucci and 
Arbour JJ spends much of its time, directly and indirectly, trying to repel 
the debilitating spectre of judicial activism. Although the majority 
emphasise time and again that 'courts must ensure that government 
behaviour conforms with constitutional norms but in doing so must also 
be sensitive to the separation of function among the legislative, judicial 
and executive branches', they are relatively quiet on how that separation 
is to be achieved. Eschewing the notion that there is some 'bright line' in 
existence, their only serious suggestion is that judges must be thoroughly 
pragmatic and contextual in their assessments: 'determining the 
boundaries of the courts' proper role, however, cannot be reduced to a 
simple test or formula; it will vary according to the right at issue and the 
context of each case.' The conclusion that 'the judicial approach to 
remedies must remain flexible and responsive to the needs of a given case' 
is unlikely to give comfort to those critics who look for some discipline in 
or direction to the courts' future performance. 13 Indeed, an uncommitted 
observer might be forgiven for thinking that, on the question of whether 
 
'law is politics', the court has given up the ghost rather exorcised the 
wraith of judicial activism. 
Accordingly, with its apparent rejection of judicial objectivity, lack 
of normative content and vague invocations of democracy, the most recent 
juristic approaches to judicial review actually serve to undermine fatally 
the project of justifying Charter adjudication's democratic legitimacy. 
Although dialogic theory is intended to calm fears that the courts are 
undisciplined and unlimited in their powers, it manages to reinforce the 
perception that courts are not only at the centre of the crucial process 
through which political discourse and values are shaped and sustained, 
but also that courts get to determine the role and contribution of the 
other branches of government. The 'degree to which judges are free to read 
their own preferences into law' seems to be reducible to the rather 
oxymoronic conclusion that they will be as 'free to read their own 
preferences into the law' as 'their own preferences' allow. There is a huge 
gap between the rhetoric of democratic dialogue and the reality of 
judicial performance. Presenting judicial review as part and parcel of a 
democratic dialogue merely underlines the extent to which democracy 
has become a pathetic caricature of itself. An elite and stilted 
conversation between the judicial and executive branches of government 
is an entirely impoverished performance of democracy; it is an empty 





It is understandable why most judges and jurists wish to ground an 
objective practice of judicial interpretation that obviates judicial value-
choices and that does not tread on the democratic toes of legislative or 
executive decision-making. However, it is a misplaced ambition and 
doomed to failure. Asjudicial review involves unelected judges 
invalidating the actions of elected legislators or executives, all judicial 
review is anti-majoritarian and, therefore, presumptively undemocratic; 
no theory can reconcile judicial review with majority rule. The Doucet 
minority are surely correct to emphasise that 'the legislature and the 
executive are ... the principal loci of democratic will'. 14 Because there is 
no way to bring such a project to a satisfactory conclusion, continuing 
attempts to do so merely exacerbate the problem of democratic 
legitimacy and erode the very confidence that the legal establishment is 
trying to maintain. A better response would be to acknowledge that 
adjudication in a society of diverse and conflicting politics is an 
inevitably ideological undertaking. Once this is done, courts will not 
necessarily become otiose or surplus to democratic requirements. 
Instead, it might be accepted that both courts and legislatures are 
involved in the same game, namely delivering substantive answers to 
concrete problems. In doing so, neither courts nor legislatures have a 
 
lock on political judgment about what is the best thing to do. Having 
abandoned the crude Bickelian counter-majoritarian challenge to the 
courts' democratic legitimacy, 15 the Supreme Court should follow through 
on the political logic of its own analysis; it must have the institutional 
courage of its own jurisprudential convictions about democracy being 
more a formal and majoritarian ideal. 
Once liberated from the confining strictures of traditional thinking, 
the question of how and whether courts act with democratic legitimacy is 
of a very different order and character. The Bickelian difficulty has little 
to say about what values are important to democracy other than an 
unthinking regard for majoritarian processes. Once the principle of 
democracy is accepted to have a substantive as well as formal dimension, 
the justification for judicial action must also be viewed in substantive as 
well as formal terms. The work of courts need not be judged by their 
capacity to be objective and impartial nor by their willingness to be 
consistent with, and not interfere with, majority politics. Instead, they 
can be evaluated in terms of the value choices that they make and 
the contribution that their decisions make to advancing substanti ve 
democracy in the here-and-now. If the traditional presumptions that 
legislatures are unprincipled and political and that courts are 
principled and reasoned are dropped, it is possible to arrive at a very 
different understanding and account of the relation between courts 
 
and legislatures. For instance, the conclusion is possible that 
legislatures and courts are both principled and unprincipled to 
greater and lesser extents at different times and that each can further 
(as well as inhibit) the cause of democratic justice on a particular issue 
as much as the other. Moreover, as Doucet suggests, reliance on 
'principles' is no less political and no more legal in any essential 
sense. The more pressing conundrum, therefore, is that, if democratic 
procedures do not guarantee democratic outcomes and democratic 
outcomes need not result from democratic procedures, how can we 
best organise constitutional arrangements so that democracy as a 
whole is more than less likely to prevail? 
Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry in a constitutional democracy is not 
to ask whether the courts have acted politically and, therefore, improperly, 
but whether the political choices that they have made serve democracy. 
Because this democratic assessment is substantive and political undertaking, 
not formal and analytical, it will always be a contested and contestable issue. 
Nevertheless, what counts as a democratic decision is not entirely 
reducible to a political and, therefore, open-ended debate about what is most 
appropriately democratic at the time and under the circumstances. The 
formal dimension of democracy insists that some account is taken of the 
general institutional location and position of relative governmental 
agencies. The fact that legislators are elected and judges are unelected has 
some political salience. However, as Doucet evidences, while judges 
 
must respect that distinction, such an allocational decision will itself be 
political and context-specific. In determining the courts' role in a functioning 
democracy, there is no authoritative and organising metaprinciple to which 
the courts ' can resort that is not itself political and controversial. The 
scope of the courts' role and power is itself part of the continuing debate 
about democracy which is a task of the most enduring and political kind. Of 
course, the concern that courts are interfering too much in the political 
process is also a valid one. There is a keen need to be vigilant about what 
courts are (and are not) doing. Any court that tramples too often on the 
policy-making prerogative of Parliament and legislatures is asking for 
trouble: judges need to recognise that they are part of democracy's 
supporting cast, not its star-performers. But, as the anti-activists fail to 
acknowledge, that democratic watch should itself be open and honest. It is 
what the courts are being active about which is the key. It is no more or less 
political to maintain the status quo than it is to subvert it; conservatism 
is as ideological as progressivism. 
Despite the denials and resistance of traditional judges and jurists, the 
common law is awash in the roiling and mucky waters of political power. 
While judges and lawyers claim to keep relatively clean and dry by 
wearing their institutional wet-suits of abstract neutrality and disinterested 
fairness, they are up to their necks in ideological muck. And this is no bad 
thing. Because it is only when judges come clean, as it were, and admit that 
they have political dirt on their hands that they will appreciate that 
adjudication generally and constitutional adjudication particularly amou nt 
 
to an organic and messy process that has a similarly organic and messy 
connection to those social needs which it claims both to reflect and shape. So 
enlightened, judges might begin to accept that they are involved in a 
political enterprise whose success and legitimacy are best evaluated not by 
the courts' formal dexterity and technical competence, but by their 
substantive contribution to the local advancement of social justice. 
Abandoning the persistent attachment to a false distinction between a 
relatively unsoiled practice of principled adjudication and a contaminated 
involvement in crude politics would be an excellent place to begin such a 
commitment. As long as its practitioners and their juristic apologists 
present the constitutional law as an insulated and insular process, courts will 
run the considerable risk of being unresponsive to and unreflective of the 
needs they are supposed to address. On the other hand, if judges and jurists 
are more willing to concede that the worlds of law and politics are 
intimately related, it might become possible to give society's needs the kind 
of direct and substantive attention that they merit. It is difficult enough for 
judges to fulfil their daunting roles without them also pretending at the same 
time that they are engaged in an entirely different enterprise. Efforts at local 
substantive justice are not enhanced by a mistaken belief that universal or 
formal coherence is at stake. Legitimacy is best attained by candour and 
frankness, not by denial and dissemblance. 
 
v. 
What has all this got to do with the present constitutional upheavals in the 
 
United Kingdom? In particular, what has this Canadian contretemps got to do 
with whether the House Lords should be replaced by a Supreme Court? My 
answer is 'absolutely everything'. The most important issues confronting the 
courts in the United Kingdom today are exactly those which underlie the 
Doucet 16 decision and which animate public and academic debate in Canada 
today. This is the problem of 'judicial activism' how can and should the 
judiciary fulfil its legitimate responsibilities in a way which vigorously 
enforces contested constitutional dictates as a matter of law against the 
legislative and/or executive branches of government, but which, at the same 
time, accepts that it is a body of unelected and unrepresentative bureaucrats 
which has no direct democratic mandate to make political decisions? Yet the 
main adversaries in the present constitutional ferment in the United Kingdom 
seem intent on refusing to acknowledge, let alone deal with, that central 
conundrum. Indeed, while they disagree about much, they join forces in their 
uncritical acknowledgement that the judicial task has and will continue to be 
satisfactorily accomplished. If the threat or fear of judicial activism is seen to 
be a problem at all, it is something for other courts and other jurisdictions to 
worry about. While the government is at pains to reassure that the need for 
reform 'does not imply any dissatisfaction with the performance of the House 
of Lords as our highest Court of Law ... [because] its judges have conducted 
themselves with the utmost integrity and independence ... [and] are widely 
and rightly admired, nationally and internationally', the judiciary 
congratulates itself on 'the calibre of our existing judiciary, which has 
resulted in our judiciary being admired around the world' .17 This is 
 
arrogance, complacency and denial on a grand scale. 
As in Canada over 20 years ago, the introduction of a Bill of Rights in the 
United Kingdom has not so much heralded in a new kind of adjudicative 
performance as highlighted the essentially political dimension of judicial 
responsibilities. What was once assumed has now become contested. Or, at 
least, it has been challenged in academic quarters and in the more critical 
circles of the legal profession. 18 The sad fact is that the judiciary itself almost 
wilfully refuses to concede that there might be such an issue, let alone that it 
might be confronted. The most that the government is prepared to concede is 
that there might be a perceptual problem in regard to the judicial branch of 
government: 'the considerable growth of judicial review in recent years has 
inevitably brought the judges more into the political eye ... [and it] is 
essential that our systems do all that they can to minimise the danger that 
judges' decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated.' 19 The 
judiciary are loathe to even make such a concession. Consequently, the 
present debate is really a fauxdebate. Whereas the most crucial challenge 
tojudicial performance is relegated to a vague and distant phantasm of 
largely foreign concern, the contending forces exhaust themselves (and the 
peripheral public) in a much less important wran gle over institutional 
arrangements. While it is clearly a positive contribution to the democratic 
project not to have the legal system's senior officials being judges, legislators 
and, in the case of the senior Law Lord, executives, there will be little genuine 
progress made in democratic terms unless and until the political dimension of 
adjudication is acknowledged and addressed. Simply to ignore that possibility, 
 
let alone its reality, is an insult to democracy and its citizens. 
A glance at the decisions by the House of Lords under the Bill of Rights 
give the lie to the claim that adjudication can proceed without any concerns 
or qualms about the judges' neutrality and political orientation. Reading 
decisions like R v DPP, exp Kebeline and Wallbank might not persuade 
critics that the judgments were ideological in any overtly bias fashion, but it is 
difficult to resist the minimal conclusion that political values played an 
important and integral role in the judges' opinions. 211 This is not to suggest 
that the judges acted inappropriately or undemocratically. My charge is 
much less crude and much more nuanced. As I have been at pains to point out 
in my discussion of Doucet and its aftermath, it is not that the judges act 
unprofessionally when they act politically, it is that the professional 
performance of adjudication cannot be done without resort to contested 
political values. My account does not in any way report that adjudication is 
arbitrary or whimsical. Notwithstanding the occasional fall from judicial grace, 
there is no suggestion that judges do anything other than make a rigorous and 
responsible fist of their judicial duties. However, this does not refute my claim 
that law is inevitably and inescapably political in operation and outcome. A 
realistic understanding of the judicial function leads to the appreciation that 
adjudication is a subtle combination of freedom (ie judges can cobble together 
the broad range of available doctrinal materials into the artefacts of their 
choosing) and constraint (ie judges are historical creatures whose imagination 
and craft are bounded by their communal affiliations, interpretive prowess, and 
personal commitments). 21 As a profoundly and pervasively political 
 
undertaking, adjudication behoves its participants and observers to 
acknowledge that questions about whether decisions are 'politically motivated' 
are pertinent and pressing. To ignore flatly and completely such a debate about 
law and politics is to offend any account and practice of democracy. 
For both the government and the judges, the most contentious item 
of constitutional business is the need to protect and ensure 'the 
independence of the judiciary'. This is an important mission. However, 
the clash between government and judiciary occupies only a small 
corner of the overall terrain on judicial independence; it is what is not 
debated and disagreed about that is more significant. Both parties seek to 
ensure that there is 'sufficient transparency of independence from the 
executive and the legislature to give people the assurance to which they 
are entitled about the independence of the Judiciary' and that the 
perception continues that 'the Law Lords, like the judiciary as a whole, 
are independent of the executive and are not susceptible to political 
pressure from any direction'.22 While it is important that such shields are 
in place, it is by no means obvious that 'judicial independence' is 
tantamount to the judiciary being left entirely to its own devices and 
desires. If judicial independence is seen only to be about preserving an 
almost unaccountable and self-regulated body of constitutional actors, it 
will not necessarily serve the broader democratic interests of the polity. 
Indeed, as played out between the government and judiciary, there is no 
sense in which it might be the politics of the judiciary that is and ought 
 
to be in contention. Again, the shared assumption is that, as long as 
the executive and legislative branches of government keep their noses 
out, all will be well and non-political because the judiciary can be 
entrusted to act in a suitably professional and technical manner. As I 
have insisted, this by no means follows. It is axiomatic that the judiciary 
be free from government interference whether from the executive or 
legislative ann of government. However, even if this is secured, it does 
not mean that all allegations of 'politics' have been resolved. There is 
much more to politics than whether the judiciary is making decisions 
which are favourable to the government of the day. For example, 
decisions which go against the government are not by that fact free 
from politics. Presumably, decisions which go against the government 
can be as equally politically motivated as those that do not go 
against the government. Judicial independence, therefore, is about 






The true colours of the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, the government 
(which, of course, is itself staffed by lawyers on these matters) are revealed in 
the details of proposed changes to the judicial appointments process. After 
 
all, the 'who' of adjudication is as or more important than the 'what'. As 
regards the new Supreme Court, the government's preference is for a 15-
member Commission (comprising five judges, five lawyers, and five non-
lawyers) to recommend a limited number of names to the Prime Minister 
who would then make the appointment. Again, the concern is primarily 
perceptual: 'whether or not the system really is biased, the perception has 
an impact which is real enough.' However, the government concedes that 
the appointments must be based on 'merit' because 'the public must have 
confidence that judges are independent, impartial and of complete integrity, 
as well as possessing the intellectual skills and personal qualities of the 
highest calibre which are required for the discharge of their duties'. Not 
surprisingly, the judiciary resoundingly echo these sentiments. While 
'increasing the diversity of our judiciary ... will help to generate public 
confidence in the justice system', the judiciary maintain that it is imperative 
that 'best qualified candidate is appointed irrespective of his or her 
background' and that the Commission avoid 'becoming so anxious to 
achieve diversity that sight is lost of the primacy of merit' .24 Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding these reservations, Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor, 
recently told the Commons' Constitutional Affairs Committee that the new 
appointments body must select women and ethnic minority judges. While it 
would be up to the Commission to decide on the actual criteria, Falconer did 
hint at the fact that 'targets' might need to be set to ensure that a representative 
diversity is achieved.25 
As viewed by both sides, there is a shared assumption that 'merit' and 
 
'diversity' are somehow independent and unrelated categories: an increase in 
diversity will threaten to undermine merit and a reliance on merit will preclude 
diversity. This is entirely wrong-headed. First of all, 'merit' is an entirely relative 
notion. Whether a person has the necessary capacities and talents to be 
successful at a given role or activity will depend upon an evaluation of the 
nature and that role. As I hope will now be obvious, what qualities and 
characteristics best comprise the 'good judge' will itself be a political and 
contestable debate. If,as the British judiciary seem to maintain, the holding of 
judicial office is purely about the intellectual and formal attributes of 
professional judgment, then there is little point in bothering too much about 
diversity. However, if that were the case, there is no reason to expect that the 
judiciary would be a starkly un-diverse body as it presently is. Indeed, one 
could be forgiven for thinking that greater diversity would indeed be an 
improvement in merit because, with no visible minorities on any superior court 
and with the first women appointed to the House of Lords only very recently, 
there has been a consistent willingness to translate 'background' into 'best 
qualified'. But if, as I have argued, adjudication involves an inescapable 
political element, it will be important to ensure that the judiciary represents a 
broader cross-section of society than it presently does. This is not to argue that 
diversity and merit are one and the same thing or that diversity will always be 
preferable to merit. On the contrary, it is to argue that diversity and merit are 
interconnected. While there is a need for meritorious candidates, it is 
nonsensical to believe that only white males possess the necessary meritorious 
qualities; this is the very essence of racism. 
 
Recognising that adjudication requires and expects judges to make 
choices among competing political values and that there is no neutral 
way to make those choices, it will be wise to work towards a process of 
appointment which embraces this operating assumption rather than one 
which goes to enormous lengths to hide and reject it. By appointing more 
women and visible minorities to the courts, the merit of the bench will be 
enhanced in that citizens might be reassured that more than one set of 
political values and experiences will be in play when judicial decisions 
are made. In making this plea for increased diversity, I am not claiming 
that identity is a reliable proxy for set values: people of similar backgrounds 
and identities do not possess the same politics merely by virtue of that 
fact. However, as a pragmatic consideration rather than an ontological 
assertion, it can be safely suggested that background and identity matter. 
It is a conceit of established groups (white, male, heterosexual etc) to 
maintain that professional objectivity is the only valid touchstone of 
legal knowledge. Too often that objectivity has turned out to be little 
more than those group's own partial and establishment interests in 
intellectual garb. If British society were rid of discrimination and had 
achieved a genuine state of equality, the appointment of women (visible 
minorities, gays etc) to elite institutions (white, male etc), like the 
proposed Supreme Court, might not be so urgent or desirable. However, 
the fact is, of course, that society is still very much marked by 
 
discrimination and inequality. Accordingly, to be a woman (visible 
minority, gay etc) is still to be the object of persecution because of, and 
not in spite of, one's identity. Unfortunately, the courts are no less culpable 
than any other institutions in this history. Consequently, the 
experience of being a woman (visible minority, gay etc) remai ns 
critical to a full understanding of what it is to be a woman (visible 
minority, gay etc) and why women (visible minority, gay etc) judges 
are required in today's society.26 
Judicial independence must also be balanced against judicial 
accountability. One of the better ways to achieve that is by way of diverse 
appointments through a democratic process. Indeed, the proposal to have the 
appointing Commission dominated by lawyers andjudges in terms of 
numerical supremacy and controlling influence is simply unacceptable. 
There is an inevitable politics to judicial appointments; there always has 
been and always will be, even if it masquerades under the dubious label of 
'merit'. The choice is not between a political and a non-political process of 
judicial appointments. Rather, it is a straightforward choice about whether the 
politics of the judiciary or the politics of the public at large, as expressed by its 
elected representatives, should prevail. While many will consider this a weak 
or even dangerous reform, it is necessitated by the nature and performance 
of the judicial function in a twenty-first century constitutional democracy. 
Such a politically informed and politically charged process will not 
contribute to a greater politicisation of the judiciary because judges are 
 
already and inevitably a thoroughly political group. It will instead bring 
those politics into public view and render them more available for public 
scrutiny: the politics of the p ublic has more democratic legitimacy than that 
of the judges. Hence, the need to ensure judicial independence is not resolved 
by abandoning all efforts at accountability. There needs to be a democratic 
trade-off between independence and accountability. If judicial independence 
is to mean that judges are left almost unregulated in their activities and 
behaviour, it is vital that the process by which they are appointed be as 
democratic as possible. This most certainly does not mean that the 
legislative branches have no role to play as the present debate seems to 
suggest. Indeed, it is only with the involvement of these branches of 
government that the courts can be entrusted to fulfil their adjudicative 
responsibilities in a meaningful, if strained democratic manner. 
Mindful of the adage that 'politics is the art of the possible', it is worthwhile 
offering some alternative proposals to the tepid proposals for reform put 
forward by the government. While there are more radical measures which 
might be taken, there are several less extreme steps that could be adopted 
which would better incorporate the understanding that law is politics and 
that judicial decisionmaking requires judges to make contested and 
controversial political choices.27 The most important innovation would be to 
create a more democratic appointments process. This could be achieved by 
establishing an independent commission. Any such body would need to be as 
diverse and as representative as possible. Accordingly, it might consist of 
about 15 members of whom five would be appointed from the House of 
 
Commons, five would be judges, and five would be citizens; tenure on the 
committee would be limited to three years and the chair of the Commission 
would be one of the lay members. Confident that no particular constituency 
(ie judicial, political or lay) had a lock on the Commission's work or 
decisions, the Commission's task would be to establish appropriate criteria 
for appointment which took seriously the need for a diverse and talented 
judiciary. Candidates could be identified either by application, nomination 
or search: interviews would be held and candidates would be subject to an 
intensive vetting. There could be rules to ensure both geographical 
representation (ie two supreme court judges for Scotland and one for 
Northern Ireland) and diversity in terms of women and visible minorities. 
Also, threshold rules for eligibility in regard to professional experience and 
qualification might be relaxed to ensure that otherwise meritorious 
candidates are not excluded. Contrary to the government's view that 'it is at 
lower levels of the Judiciary that the criteria might need to be re-examined' 
,28 such innovations are best made at the highest level in order to confirm 
the sincerity and importance of the commitment to diversity and change. In 
all its acti vities, the Commission would ensure that diversity was not a 
secondary consideration, but a primary component of 'merit'. 
The recommendations of the Commission would be final and direct. 
The diverse com position and democratic operation of the Commission 
would obviate the need for approval by the Prime Minister or confirmation 
hearings in Parliament. This is not because such procedures are 
'inconsistent with the move to take the Supreme Court out of the potential 
 
political arena', but because the Commission itself will perform such a role 
more effectively and will be less likely to turn the appointments process 
into a media circus as in the United States. Furthermore, there should be a 
complement of nine Supreme Court judges who, except on leave 
applications and conflicts, should always sit as a full court: this would not 
only reduce the opportunities for inconsistent decisions, but would also 
avoid any suggestions of manipulation in panelselection. It cannot simply 
be concluded that, whereas 'in the United States, appointments to the 
Supreme Court are more political, and therefore there is a stronger possibility 
that the composition of the court might affect the outcome, ... this is not the 
case in the United Kingdom' .29 Also, there should be a public register of 
'judicial interests' and a tougher set of conflicts rules under a 
comprehensive Code of Judicial Conduct which could be administered by the 
Appointments Commission. Judges should also have a fixed tenure of 
appointment of no more than 12 years. While the Commission would have 
the power to receive complaints and discipline judges, it would not be 
able to dismiss judges without formal approval by Parliament. Finally, to 
put the performance of the Supreme Court judges on a more secure and less 
amateurish footing, there should be a better administrative infrastructure and 
support staff: better commu nication on the court's activities could be 
developed and executive 'headnotes' of decisions might be provided. While 
this package of reform proposals will not guarantee both the democratic 
accountability and institutional independence of the judiciary, it will better 






Much of the immediate Canadian response to Doucet 30 has been framed by 
the concern over whether the judiciary had trespassed on forbidden 
political ground. However, there seems a broader and more troubling 
dynamic underlying the litigated issue that democratic choice should not 
be only between rule by a judicial elite or a governmental elite, but through a 
political process that is more responsive to broader constitutional and 
democratic concerns. To conceive that the Doucet decision resurrects only the 
dilemma of whether courts can or should invade the political domain misses 
the main point: courts cannot exercise their powers and responsibilities 
without reference to contested values and principles of governance. The real 
and neglected issue is not the politicisation of the judiciary, but the democratic 
failure of the executive· and legislative in fulfilling their constitutional 
responsibilities and mandate. If governments and legislatures were truly 
representative and were doing more of what they were supposed to being 
doing in a constitutional democracy, the question of what judges do would be 
less pressing and more incidental. Ifthere is a crisis in Canadian democracy, 
it is to be found in the fact that politicians and legislators are simply not 
'democrats' i n the full sense of the term. 'Democracy' is used more as a 
rhetorical cloak for elitist practice than a measure and guide for popular 
politics. After all, a drop in voter tum-out in federal elections from 76% in 
 
1979 to 61% in 2000 is hardly reassuring. 
Ironically, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is viewed 
favourably and increasingly so by large majorities in all regions, with the highest 
rate of approval of 91% in Quebec, and the lowest of 86% in the West. 
Moreover, 71% say that the Court and not Parliament should have the final 
say when the Supreme Court declares a law unconstitutional because it conflicts 
with the Charter. Indeed, 66% say they trust judges to do the right thing either 
all the time or most of the time. Furthermore, 'the Charter is seen as important 
to Canadian identity by more people than is the national anthem or the flag' .31 
Nevertheless, the fact that public opinion polls show considerable support for 
the Supreme Court is less an accolade for judges and more a slap in the face for 
politicians, particularly those leaders who preside in and over Cabinet. Judges 
can only ever do a second-best job at making up the democratic deficit in the 
present performance of Canadian politics. The Supreme Court decision in 
Doucet is indicative of that. While the judiciary has some defined and important 
function in Canadian politics, it must be limited and partial. Being neither 
elected by nor representative of Canadians, judges can never be entirely or 
rightly sanguine about the force and solidity of their democratic legitimacy. 
On the other hand, while the executive can lay claim to greater democratic 
legitimacy, its practical exercise of power offends its democratic pedigree. Too 
often, political leaders seem to dance to their own tune rather than that of the 
people they represent. Increased 'rule by Cabinet' is hardly that much better 
than extended 'rule by the Supreme Court'. While the statistics reveal 
interesting support for the courts, they express profound dissatisfaction with 
 
the political leaders: only 22% of Canadians trust their leaders to do the right 
thing at all. 
To revamp the legislative and executive process in line with greater 
popular participation and political accountability will require a 
monumental effort. Any changes proportional representation, recall 
legislation, accountability audits, genuine ministerial responsibility, 
referenda etc must themselves be products of the very democratic process 
that is to be enhanced. There are no easy solutions to the present 
undemocratic trends. However, the debate around judicial activism is 
something of a distraction. Improvement in Canada's democratic status 
will not come from increased interventions by judges in the micro-
management of governmental policies. Indeed, judicial supervision is a 
short-term crutch that actually harms a limping polity in the mediumand 
long-term. The replacement of one elite rule (executive) by another 
(judicial) can only be considered positive under the most warped sense of 
democracy. So, if there is a desire to reign in the judges, there must also be 
a commitment to ensuring that elected politicians and officials are living 
up to their own and demanding constitutional and democratic 
responsibilities. At present, they are palpably not. But simply construing 
the democratic challenge as being one about whether the judges stay out 
of or stray onto the political terrain is to misrepresent the problem and, 
therefore, to hamper any genuine solutions. 
Despite the regular rounds of self-congratulation about Canada's 
 
ranking as one of the best societies to live in, there is a serious erosion 
of basic democratic precepts. 32 The twin foundations of democracy 
popular participation and political accountability are going the way of the 
polar icecaps. There seems to be an implicit Faustian bargain between 
elite and rank-and-file that the price of socio-economic advancement 
(which is still questionable when looked at in other than mean or median 
terms) is at the cost of democratic involvement. The Charter and its 
judicial enforcement are part of that arrangement. Whatever else it means, 
democracy demands that there be more power to the people and less to 
the elites. Aristocratic rule is no less palatable because judges and 
political leaders are the new dukes and barons. And, it is certainly no 
more acceptable when such elites wrap themselves in the trappings of 
democracy. While there has never been a golden age for Canadian 
democracy, what now passes for 'democracy' is an exclusive, sporadic and 
sketchy conversation between the judicial and executive branches of 
government over what is best for the country. In this exchange, the voices 
of ordinary Canadians play no real or substantive role. Of course, a 
robust judiciary has a definite role in a vital democracy, but judges can 
only ever do a second-best job at making up the democratic deficit in the 
present performance of Canadian politics; they are neither positioned nor 
skilled to handle such a task. Nevertheless, it is a sign of a healthy 
democracy that Canadians are at least arguing about and grappling with 
 
'judicial activism' and its implications for a constitutional polity. If the 
present debate about establishing a new Supreme Court is anything to go 
by, the British are still in denial and have not even begun to take the 






1. M Arnold 'Dover Beach' in Dover beach and other poems (New York: Dover Publications, 
1994). 
2. Doucet-Boudreau  v Nova Scotia ( Minister of Education ) (2003] SCC 62. 
3. [2003) SCC 62 at 28, per Iacobucci and Arbour JJ, as joined by McLachlin CJ, Gonthier, 
and Bastarache JJ. 
4. [2003] SCC 62 at 45, per LeBel and Deschamps, asjoined by Major and Binnie JJ. 
5. For a sampling of the responses, see Gunter 'Judicial Arrogance Borders on Monarchial' 
National Post, 20 November 2003, p A l8; Makin 'Top Court Pursuing Activism' The Globe and 
Mail, 13 November 2003, p A l6; 'Judicial Rule' Editorial National Post, 8 November 2003, p A 
l 9; Young 'Court Gives Our Toothless Charter Sharp Fangs' The Toronto Star 23 November 
2003, p F07; and Roach 'Do We Want Judges with More Muscle?' The Globe and Mail, 13 
November 2003, p A27. 
6. See, for example, F Morton and R Knopff The charter revolution and the court party 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000); and R Martin The most dangerous branch: how the Supreme 
Court of Canada has undermined our law and our democracy (Montreal: McGill  University  Press,  
2003). 
7. See A Hutchinson Work-in-progress: evolution and the common law (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2004). 
8. Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia ( Minister of Education ) [2003] SCC 62. 
9. [2003] SCC 62 at 37, 41, 33, 37 and 41, per LeBel and Deschamps JJ. 
10. For a full and unimpeachable account of these developments, see A Petter Twenty years of 
charter justification: from liberal legalism to dubious dialogue (forthcoming, 2004). 
11. K Roach The Supreme Court on trial: judicial activism or democratic dialogue (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2001 ) p 106. See also Hogg and Bushell 'The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)' (1997) 35 Os 
HLJ 75 ( 1997). 
12. Bell Express Vu Limited Partnership v R [2002] 2 SCR 559 at paras 65--66. See also Vriend v 
Alberta [1998] l SCR 493; and Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs ) [ 
1999] 2 SCR 203. 
13. Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia ( Minister of Education ) [2003) SCC 62 at 19, 20 and 25, per 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. 
14. Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education ) [2003] SCC 62 at 41, per LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. 
15. See A Bickel The least dangerous branch: the Supreme Court at the bar of politics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd edn, 1986) pp 14-18. For a more sophisticated approach, see E 
Chemerinsky Interpreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988) pp 11-12; and 
Chemerinsky 'Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution' (1989) 103 Harv LR 43. 
16. Doucet-Boudreau  v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education ) [2003) SCC 62. 
17. See Department for Constitutional Affairs Constitutional reform: a Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom CP 11/03 (2003) p 5; and Judges' Council Response to the Consultation Papers 
on Constitutional Reform (2003) p 26. 
18. For a solid survey of the extensive literature and its present 'dialogic' tum, see Poole 'Review 
Article: Dogmatic Liberalism? T R S Allan and The Common Law Constitution' (2002) 65 MLR 463; 
and Clayton 'Judicial Deference and "Democratic Dialogue": The Legitimacy of Judicial 
Intervention under the Human Rights Act' [2004] PL. 
19. Department for Constitutional Affairs, n  17 above, p 12. 
20. R v DPP, ex p Kebeline [2002] 2 AC 326 and Parochial Church Council of the Parish of 
Aston Cantlow v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2003] 3 All ER 1213 on the 'freedom' of the courts 
to adopt a more expansive interpretative role in order to avoid declaration of incompatibility 
under the HRS. There is a good discussion of this in T Campbell 'Incorporation through 
Interpretation in T Campbell, K D Ewing and A Tomkins (eds) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 ) p 79. 
21. See A Hutchinson It's all in the game: a non-foundationalist account of law and 
adjudication (London: Duke University Press, 2000); and D Kennedy A critique of 
adjudication: fin de siecle (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
22. Department for Constitutional Affairs, n 17 above, p 12; and Judges' Council, n 17 above, p 48. 
23. See J A G Griffiths Thepolitics of thejudiciary  (London: Fontana Press, 5th edn, 1997). 
24. Department for Constitutional Affairs Constitutional Reform: A New Wayof Appointing Judges CP 
10103 (2003) p 20; and Judges' Council, n 17 above, pp 4, 28 and 31. 
25. 'No Further Delay on Judicial System Reforms' Press Association News, 6 January 2004. 
 
26. As appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada show, the performance of its women 
judges has been varied and far from uniform in their political commitments. See, for example, 
Morgentaler v The Queen [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 161-184, per Wilson J; Lavallee [1990] l SCR 
852 at 856-897, per Wilson; Symes [1993] 4 SCR 695 at 776- 832, per L'Heureux-Dube; R v 
Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 597-642, per MacLachlin and at 643-713, per L'Heureux-Dube; and 
R v Carosella [1997] I SCR 88 at 114-155, per L'Heureux-Dube. 
27. Of course, there is no compelling reason why courts should remain at the centre of constitutional 
politics. For instance, Mark Tushnet has been developing a rich and provocative body of work on 
how best to develop non-judicial forums for constitutional decision-making. See, for example, Taking 
the constitution awayfrom the courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and 'Non-Judicial 
Review' (2003) 40 Harv J on Legis 
453. . See Ewing 'A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable 
and Independent Judiciary' (2000) 38 Alta LR 208. 
28. Department for Constitutional Affairs, n 17 above, p 33. 
29. Department for Constitutional Affairs, n 17 above, pp 34 and 38. 
30. Doucet-Boudreau  v Nova Scotia ( Minister of Education )  [2003] SCC 62. 
31. Centre for Research and Information on Canada The Charter: Dividing or uniting Canadians? 
(2003) p 6. 
32. See, for example, Human Development Report Deepening democracy in afragmented world 
(2002). 
 
 
 
